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Abstract
We study a model describing the spread of a globalized culture in
a population of individuals localized at the nodes of a social network.
The influence of this globalized culture, assumed to be foreign to the
local culture, is measured by a probability to convince each individual
to adopt its cultural traits. This probability depends upon the degree
s—a real between 0 and 1—of “wise” skepticism characterizing the
personality of each individual and a parameter a representing the re-
sistance of the society as a whole to the spread of the foreign cultural
traits. A greater a indicates a stronger resistance of the local culture
to globalization. On the other hand, each individual interacts with
a random number of other individuals—her cultural neighborhood—
uniformly distributed between 1 and a maximum value. The probabil-
ity distribution of an individual to belong to the cultural neighborhood
of another individual has a power-law behavior. A small fraction r of
the total population belonging to the tail of this probability distribu-
tion have an s-value equal to 1. They represent the most conservative
individuals firmly attached to their local culture.
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1 Introduction
Globalization refers to the growing integration of economies and societies over
the past two decades [1]. This process, made possible by the rapid advances
in communication technologies, has created a smaller world in which ideas
and money can move across borders almost instantly.
Since the early 1990s, globalization has triggered a storm of controversy
among social activists, intellectuals, business leaders, policy makers and
politicians. The debate over globalization is often passionate and, some-
times, even violent. Proponents [2, 3, 4, 5] consider market liberalism as
highly productive, raising living standards worldwide, and favoring innova-
tions, but critics [6, 7, 8] argue that globalization creates inequalities, loss
of jobs, environmental degradation, and “is a declaration of war upon all
cultures.” [9]
Globalization has a great impact on culture. It destroys local traditions
in order to create a homogenized world culture. Culture is a multifaceted
concept characterizing the behavior acquired through social interactions of
human beings as members of a society. It involves, at least, three components:
what these individuals think, what they do, and the material products they
produce [10]. Many sociologists have discussed the influence of globalization
on culture.
According to Samuel Huntington [11, 12], the “great divisions among hu-
mankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” Though
many scholars agreed with Huntington, many also criticized his aggressive
picture of the non-Western civilizations while ignoring the misdeeds of the
Western civilization [13]. These misdeeds of the Western civilization have
been depicted by George Ritzer as The McDonaldization of Society [14, 15,
16]. For Ritzer, McDonaldization is rationalization taken to an extreme level
with the consequence that creativity is taken out of all activities, turning
them into a series of routinized kinds of procedures. For Benjamin Bar-
ber [17], the alternative of the aggressive economic and cultural globalism
of McWorld is Jihad, understood not as Islam but as disintegral tribalism
and reactionary fundamentalism. While McWorld eliminates our differences,
Jihad overemphasizes those differences. The future of international relations
is dominated by their conflict.
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When you visit a mall, sit in a multiplex movie theater, sleep in a modern
hotel or eat in a fast-food restaurant, it is not easy to figure out where you
are. McWorld requires uniformity to maximize profits. But, is it possible
to protect cultural diversity, which “is as necessary for humankind as biodi-
versity is for nature,” according UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural
Diversity?1
In September 1993 Europeans, led by the French, demanded that trade in
audiovisual products be left outside the GATT agreement, arguing that cul-
tural products cannot be treated as ordinary commercial products. The idea
behind this so called exception culturelle (cultural exception) was that with-
out imposing restrictions to control the flow of cheap American products
onto European markets, European culture would be threatened. European
protectionism, of course strongly resisted by the US, was seen as an essential
condition to prevent all the globe from becoming Disneyland.
Between cultural differentialism or lasting difference and cultural convergence
or growing sameness, there is, according to Nederveen Pieterse [18], a third
way: cultural hybridization, global me´lange, or ongoing mixing. According
to Benjamin Barber, apparent hybridization is just be thinly disguised glob-
alized monoculture [17]: “McDonald’s adapts to foreign climes with wine in
France even as it imposes a way of life that makes domestic wines irrele-
vant.”
2 Model’s Description
In order to understand if cultural diversity can be protected, we have studied
a model for the spread of a globalized culture in a population of individuals
located at the vertices of a scale-free social network. In this paper the social
network is a directed graph, that is, an ordered pair of disjoint sets (V,E),
where V is a nonempty set of elements called vertices, nodes, or points, and
E a set of ordered pairs of distinct elements of V , called directed edges, arcs,
or links. Most social networks [19, 20, 21, 22, 23] are characterized by a small
average shortest path length between two randomly selected vertices, a high
1This declaration has been adopted in Paris on November 2, 2001. It can be found at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/extern/gats2000/decl-en.pdf.
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clustering coefficient and a power-law probability distribution for the vertex
degrees.
Following Axelrod [24] an individual’s culture is represented by an ordered
list of features such as dress style or customary food. Each feature has a
set of traits, which are the alternative values the feature may have. If the
culture is defined by f different features, each taking n different values, the
culture of every individual is described by a sequence of f integers ranging
from 1 to n. In our model, the globalized culture is assumed to be foreign
to the local culture and has, therefore, cultural trait values not shared by
the population. Conventionally we characterize the globalized culture by a
sequence of f zeros.
Each individual’s personality is represented by a real number s between 0
and 1, which may also be viewed as her social status. An individual with
a high s-value has a strong convincing power when interacting with other
individuals and a high degree of “wise” skepticism when interacting with the
foreign culture.
In order to mimic cultural exception, that is, the resistance to the spread of
the foreign culture, the interaction of the individuals with the foreign culture
is characterized by a positive exponent a. A larger a indicates a stronger
resistance of the local culture to globalization. The exponent a can also be
viewed as a measure of the effort made by the society to teach and promote
its specific culture.
More precisely, our social network model is represented by a directed graph
with N nodes. Each node is occupied by an individual characterized by
1- her name: an integer between 1 and N ,
2- her s-value: a real between 0 and 1,
3- the list of her cultural neighbors : a list of other individuals with whom
she interacts,2
4- her culture: a list of f trait values, ranging from 1 to n.
The size of each neighborhood is a random integer uniformly distributed
2The cultural neighbors of an individual are not necessarily people that person phys-
ically meets, they could be, for instance, writers or movie directors attached to local
cultural traits values.
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between 1 and the maximum cultural neighborhood size, here taken equal
to either 8 or 17, An individual k belongs to the cultural neighborhood of
individual i 6= k if the directed link (i, k) belongs to the set E of graph’s
edges. While vertex out-degrees are uniformly distributed between 1 and
the maximum cultural neighborhood size, the random selection of neighbors
is such that vertex in-degrees have a Pareto probability distribution with a
minimum value parameter equal to 1 and a shape parameter equal to 2,3
that is, the Pareto cumulative distribution function x 7→ 1−x−2, and, conse-
quently, a probability density function x 7→ 2x−3. We shall call such a social
network, a Pareto society. A fraction r of the total number N of individuals,
selected among those having the highest in-degrees, defines the subnetwork
of cultural leaders, that is, the subnetwork of the most influential individuals
whose s-value is set equal to 1. For example, in an initial configuration with
a fraction of cultural leaders r = 0.1, a maximum cultural neighborhood size
equal to 8 and a culture defined by only two features (f = 2), each taking
only two possible different trait values (1 or 2), the state of individual 789
is (
789, 0.094619, (1396, 579, 2117, 2143, 148, 702), (2, 1)
)
.
She has an s-value equal to 0.094619, her cultural neighborhood, of size 6,
is
(1396, 579, 2117, 2143, 148, 702),
and her culture is represented by the pair of trait values (2, 1).
The global evolution rule of the social network consists of two synchronous
subrules defined as follows.
1- Imitate rule: At each time step, every individual locates the person in
her neighborhood who has the highest s-value and changes the value
of one of her randomly selected feature trait to equal the value of the
corresponding trait value of that person if, and only if, her s-value is
less than the s-value of that person.
3The cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution with a minimum value
parameter equal to x0 and a shape parameter equal to σ is
x 7→ 1−
(
x0
x
)
σ
.
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2- Globalizing rule: At each time step, a randomly selected feature trait
of each individual is changed to 0 with a probabilty (1 − s)a, where s
is the s-value of the individual and a the exponent characterizing the
resistance of the society to the spread of the globalized foreign culture.
If it were not for the imitate rule, under the action of the globalizing rule,
all individuals having an s-value less than 1, that is, the majority, will even-
tually adopt all the trait values of the foreign culture. The globalizing rule
mimics the role of the huge advertising power of multinational corporations
conquering a new national market. Only the fraction r of the most influential
individuals, with an s-value equal to 1, will, in any case, never adhere to the
foreign culture. They represent a small fraction of conservative individuals
firmly attached to their culture keeping unchanged their cultural traits under
the action of the evolution rule.
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Figure 1: Fraction of the total number of individuals adhering to the foreign
culture in the case of a society with a fraction of cultural leaders r = 0.1, and
a culture characterized by only 2 features with either 2 (top) or 10 (bottom)
traits per feature.
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Note that this model can be adapted to study related problems such as, for
example, the struggle between local brands of a given product (drink, cos-
metic, appliance) and a new brand trying to conquer the local market.
3 Numerical Results
In all our simulations the social network consists of 2500 individuals. The
steady state is reached rather rapidly, after about a few hundreds time
steps.
Consider first the case of a society with a fraction of cultural leaders r = 0.1, a
cultural neighborhood maximum size equal to 8, and a culture characterized
by only 2 features. Whatever the number of different traits per feature, the
numbers of fully convinced, partially convinced and unconvinced individuals
are not modified. This is not surprising since, in this model, the probability
for an individual to adopt the trait value of the foreign culture does not
depend upon her original trait value. As shown in Figure 1, for a = 1.7,
approximately half of the total population either partially or fully adheres to
the foreign culture.
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Figure 2: Fraction of the total number of individuals adhering to the foreign
culture in the case of a society with a fraction of cultural leaders r = 0.1, an
exponent a = 3.0, and a culture characterized by 6 features and 2 traits per
feature.
If we increase the number f of features, we have to increase the resistance
of the local culture to the foreign culture, that is, increase the exponent a,
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to keep the same number of individuals rejecting the foreign culture (see
Figure 2). When the number of features increases, the number of fully con-
vinced individuals, that is, the number of individuals adopting all the trait
values of the foreign culture, sharply decreases since the probability for an
individual to adopt all the feature trait values of the foreign culture decreases
exponentially with the number of features.
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Figure 3: Fraction of the total number of individuals adhering to the foreign
culture for a = 2.7 in the case of a society with a fraction of cultural leaders
r = 0.02, and a culture characterized by only 2 features and 2 traits per
feature.
If we decrease the fraction r of cultural leaders, clearly we have to increase the
exponent a for the foreign culture not to be able to convince more than half
of the population accepting the new culture traits. For a = 2.7, as shown in
Figure 3, approximately half of the total population either partially or fully
adheres to the foreign culture. The fraction r of cultural leaders being equal
to 0.02, in this case, 48 % of the total number of indiduals with an s-value
less than 1 totally rejects the foreign culture.
All these results were obtained with a cultural neighborhood maximum size
equal to 8, that is, an average number of cultural neighbors equal to 4.5. If
we increase this number, the individuals become more connected and, con-
sequently, are able to resist more effectively to the influence of the foreign
culture. Doubling the average number of neighbors, that is, choosing a cul-
tural neighborhood maximum size equal to 17, for r = 0.1, f = 2, and n = 2,
the value of exponent a necessary to keep the sum of the numbers of fully
convinced and partially convinced individuals not larger than half of the total
population decreases slightly from 3.0 to 2.8 as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Fraction of the total number of individuals adhering to the foreign
culture for a = 2.8 in the case of a society with a fraction of cultural leaders
r = 0.1, a randomly uniformly distributed neighborhood size between 1 and
17, and a culture characterized by 6 features and 2 traits per feature.
4 Results Analysis
What does differentiate the different groups of individuals? In the case of a
society with a fraction of cultural leaders r = 0.1, 6 features with 2 traits
each, and an average cultural neighborhood size equal to 4.5. For a = 3.0 we
find approximately that
• 2.6 % of the population fully adopt the foreign culture,
• 47.4 % of the population partially adopt the foreign culture,
• 40 % of individuals with an s-value less than 1 completely reject the
foreign culture, and
• 10 % leaders who, in any case, never adopt any foreign cultural trait.
Individuals fully adopting the foreign culture are characterized by a small
number of neighbors, 1.4 per individual on average, and among these neigh-
bors no cultural leaders are present. That is, individuals easily influenced by
the foreign culture are weakly connected to other individuals, and have no
interactions with cultural leaders.
Individuals partially adopting the foreign culture have an average of 2.67 out
of 6 traits equal to 0. Their average neighborhood size, which is equal to
4.4, includes an average number of cultural leaders equal to 1.47, allowing
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them to make up for their small s-values—which can even be slightly smaller
than the s-values of individuals fully adopting the foreign culture (in our
simulations, 0.25 compared to 0.33 on average).
In a society with a culture defined by 6 different features, the individuals
adopting all the culture traits of the foreign culture are not characterized
by the lowest s-value. They may even have a slightly higher s-value than
the individuals who only partially adopt the foreign cultural traits. Their
essential characteristic is the small size of their cultural neighborhood which,
moreover, does not include any cultural leader.
Individuals completely rejecting the foreign culture are characterized by a
high s-value—0.88 on average—and have, on average, a number of cultural
neighbors equal to 4.67 including 1.68 cultural leaders.
5 Conclusion
We have studied a model describing the spread of a globalized culture in a
population of individuals localized at the nodes of a social network. At each
time step, under the influence of the cultural neighbors a person interacts
with, this person, whose social status is measured by a parameter s between
0 and 1, may modify one of her cultural traits to adopt the corresponding
trait of her neighbor having the greatest s-value. A small fraction r of the
total population are cultural leaders, champions of their local culture who
have a very strong convincing power when interacting with other individuals.
Moreover, all individuals are under the influence of a foreign culture whose
probability to convince a particular individual is a decreasing function of her
s-value and the exponent a characterizing the resistance of the society as
a whole. As a result of both interactions, the individuals may be divided
into three groups. The fully convinced group consists of individuals who,
in the steady state, have fully adopted all the cultural traits of the foreign
culture. They are essentially individuals who interact with very few other
individuals and, in particular, do not interact with the fraction r of cultural
leaders, promoting champions of the local culture. The partially convinced
group are individuals who interact with a number of other individuals close
to the average value of neighborhood sizes with among them a reasonable
number cultural leaders, but their average s-value is small, making them
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easy to influence. The individuals of the unconvinced group have the same
characteristics as the individuals of the previous group except that they have
a very high average s-value.
In essence, this model shows that to resist globalization and keep alive a
diverse local culture, role models are essential, creations of as many links
as possible between individuals sharing the same local culture has to be
encouraged, and the society as a whole must make every effort to protect
and promote its own culture even at the cost of not fully respecting the rules
of free trade.
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